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Summary. We study a Gale-like matching model in a large exchange economy,
in which trade takes place through non-cooperative bargaining in coalitions of
ﬁnite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show
that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with the Walrasian
allocations of the economy. Our method of proof makes use of the theory of the
core. With respect to previous work, our positive implementation result applies
to a substantially larger class of economies: the model relaxes differentiability
and convexity of preferences, and also admits an arbitrary number of divisible
and indivisible goods.
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1 Introduction
The Walrasian or competitive equilibrium is the central solution concept in eco-
nomics. However, from its deﬁnition it is not clear what trading procedures lead
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to Walrasian outcomes. In contrast to what many economists may think, the orig-
inal account of the theory (Walras, 1874) does not rely on the existence of the
so-called Walrasian auctioneer.1 Nonetheless, the usual formal presentation of
the model includes the auctioneer implicitly due to a lack of explanation for the
formation of equilibrium prices.
Negishi (1989) distinguishes two major schools in the analysis of markets.
One of them considers prices as part of the economic mechanism in and out of
equilibrium. This school is attributed to Cournot (1838) and Walras (1874). A
second school, associated with Jevons (1879) and Edgeworth (1881), attempts to
consider decentralized trading mechanisms and answer the question of whether
equilibrium prices will emerge as the consequence of agents’ trading actions.
We can distinguish at least two major approaches in the Jevons-Edgeworth
school of decentralized trading. One of them, which today is referred to as the
core equivalence literature, has its origins in Edgeworth (1881). This approach
ﬁnds conditions under which core and Walrasian allocations are equivalent. If one
conceives the core as a decentralized mechanism, these results give insights about
the Walrasian allocations that were not provided by Walras. The shortcoming of
this approach is that, although the core captures a natural idea of coalitional
stability, it does not specify the trading procedure either. Here is relevant the
work on the non-cooperative implementation of the core in ﬁnite games and
economies (see, for example, Perry and Reny, 1994; Serrano, 1995; Serrano and
Vohra, 1997).
A second approach models the trading procedure more explicitly and studies
its strategic equilibria. As part of a recent literature that starts with Rubinstein
(1982) and Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) [henceforth, RW], many researchers
have turned to models where a decentralized trading procedure is made explicit
in a bargaining extensive form.2 RW (1985) analyze a market for an indivisible
good and claim that in a frictionless economy the strategic equilibria need not be
Walrasian. This claim was challenged later by the classic paper of Gale (1986a),
who constructed an alternative bargaining procedure in a continuum economy
with divisible commodities, in which strategic and Walrasian equilibria coincide.
Gale’s work was generalized in some respects by McLennan and Sonnenschein
(1991) [McLS in the sequel]. Finally, Gale (1987) studies a market for a single
indivisible good and also obtains a Walrasian result.
Combining the above strands of the literature, in this paper we study a match-
ing model in a large exchange economy, in which trade takes place through
non-cooperative bargaining in coalitions of ﬁnite size. Under essentially the con-
1 ‘The markets which are best organized from a competitive standpoint are those in which purchases
and sales are made by auctions ... Besides these markets, there are others, such as the fruit, vegetables
and poultry markets, where competition, though not so well organized, functions fairly effectively and
satisfactorily. City streets with their stores and shops of all kinds —baker’s, butcher’s, grocer’s,
taylor’s, shoemaker’s, etc.— are markets where competition, though poorly organized, nevertheless
operates quite adequately... ’. (Walras, 1874, pp. 83–84).
2 See Diamond and Maskin (1979), and also Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, Chap.6) and the
references therein for earlier models of decentralized trade in pairwise meetings where each pair uses
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ditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes
of our model coincide with the Walrasian allocations of the economy. With re-
spect to the papers of the previous paragraph, our model relaxes differentiability
and convexity of preferences, and also admits an arbitrary number of divisible
and indivisible goods. By considering multilateral meetings in which trade takes
place, we are able to use the full power of the theory of the core. In doing so, it
becomes apparent that the driving force behind core equivalence and Gale–like
results is similar: core equivalence takes now a non-cooperative dimension.
From an implementation theoretic point of view, we construct a mechanism
that fully implements the Walrasian allocations of an economy with a continuum
of agents. In contrast to all previous work, though, implementation is achieved
over a substantially larger class of economies. Moreover, our mechanism can
be seen as an -perturbation of Gale’s, since meetings involving more than two
agents can be assumed to have negligible probability. Thus, our results demon-
strate that ﬁxing a correspondence of interest (the Walrasian in this case), by
perturbing slightly a successful mechanism one may create very positive effects
on the domain over which implementation takes place. It is interesting to com-
pare this insight to the virtual implementation results, where for a ﬁxed domain,
the slight perturbation of the solution concept (approximate rather than exact im-
plementation) has also very positive effects on the set of correspondences that a
planner can (approximately) implement (see Matsushima, 1988; Abreu and Sen,
1991).
Like going from Jevons to Edgeworth, our theory of exchange departs from
the one based on pairwise meetings. That is, free of the differentiability assump-
tion, our model differs from the preceeding ones in allowing for trade to take
place in coalitions. This trade-off in the modelling choice leads to two distinct
methods of proof and captures different insights. The proofs of the existing re-
sults (Gale, 1986a,c; McLS, 1991) rely crucially on the existence of the marginal
rate of substitution at every bundle in order to get the unique (to that bundle)
supporting price. Since in the strategic equilibria of these models there cannot
be any pair of agents with positive gains from trade, by differentiability, at the
equilibrium bundles every two agents have the same marginal rate of substitu-
tion. Consequently, this must hold for all agents. Feasibility of the equilibrium
outcome (zero aggregate excess demand) and some extra technical assumptions
then take care of the rest of the argument. In contrast to this method of proof,
Theorem 1 uses the theory of the core to show that every strategic equilibrium
yields a Walrasian allocation. The existence of marginal rates of substitution is not
necessary. Since we allow for ﬁnite coalitions to meet, in our strategic equilibria
there cannot be any such coalition with positive gains from trade. Then, a power-
ful lemma due to Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders (1989) and core equivalence
take us the rest of the way without the intermediate aid of differentiability.3
Unlike our ﬁrst result just referred to, its converse, Theorem 2, does not use in
its proof the theory of the core. That is, although we allow for ﬁnite coalitions, it
3 Gale (1987) does not rely on differentiability, but the arguments there are conﬁned to a market
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turns out that all equilibrium outcomes of our game can be supported by strategies
according to which all trade takes place in pairs. Moreover, if all gains from trade
in the economy can be exhausted in coalitions bounded by a given ﬁnite size k
[e.g. assignment markets, like in RW (1985) or Gale (1987), in which k = 2],
one can restrict the matching process to meetings of size k + 1. Thus, in some
cases only very small coalitions are needed for the result.
The paper is organized as follows: Sect.2 describes the underlying economic
model. The non-cooperative bargaining game is described in Sect.3. The main
result is presented in Sect. 4. In Sect.5 we show that every Walrasian allocation
can be supported by a strategic equilibrium of the game, and Sect. 6 concludes
and compares our results with the previous literature.
2 Description of the economy
Let (A;A;) be a measure space, where A is the set of agents, A is the set of
measurable subsets of A, and  is an atomless measure. We denote by C the set of
agents’ characteristics. An element c 2 C is a pair c =( u;e), where u : X ! R
is a utility function, X is the consumption set and e 2 X is an endowment.
The consumption set X is assumed to be identical for all agents and is of the
form RD
+ NI, where N is the set of non-negative integers. The consumption set
includes jDj divisible goods and jIj indivisible goods; we assume that jDj1.
An economy E is a measurable map E : A ! C. Let S  A be a coalition.
An S-allocation f is a measurable map f : S ! X that satisﬁes
R
S f (a)d  R
S e(a)d. A-allocations are called simply allocations. We denote by F the set
of allocations of the economy. From now on, and whenever there is no danger
of confusion, the domain of integration A of the set of all agents will be omitted.
A coalition S can improve upon an allocation f if S has a positive measure
and there exists an S-allocation g : S ! X such that almost everywhere in S
ua(g(a)) > ua(f (a)). The core of an economy is the set of all allocations that no
coalition can improve upon (see Aumann, 1964).
We shall make the following assumptions on the utility functions of the
agents. The assumptions can be grouped into two classes. First, we need the as-
sumptions of Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders (1989) that guarantee the validity
of their core equivalence theorem, different from Aumann’s, as is based on a
core with respect to ﬁnite coalitions.
A0 All the commodities are present in the economy:
R
e(a)d  0.
For all c =( u;e) 2 C:
A1 The utility function u is continuous, strictly increasing in the divisible com-
modities, and non-decreasing in the indivisible commodities;
A2 for all (xD;xI) 2 RD
+  NI, there exists yD 2 RD
+ such that u(yD;0I) >
u(xD;xI); and
A3 for all xI 2 NI;u(e) > u(0D;xI).Bargaining, coalitions and competition 283
A0 is merely technical. A1 states that preferences are continuous and monotone.
A2 expresses the basic desirability of divisible goods (money, for example).
Finally, A3 implies that an agent’s initial endowment contains some divisible
goods.
In addition, we need assumptions that are necessary to deal with the possibly
random outcome of the strategic bargaining process. A4 is mainly a technical
assumption, while A5 has an interesting economic meaning: it guarantees that
the aggregate economy’s feasible utility set is convex, even though individual
agents may not be risk averse.
A4 The utility functions are bounded: For all c =( u;e) 2 C: there exists a
number ku such that u(x)  ku for all x 2 X.
A5 The economy satisﬁes strong aggregate risk aversion in the individually
rational domain (deﬁned in the following paragraphs.)
Aggregate risk aversion
Gale (1986a, b, c) assumes that all individuals have strictly concave utility func-
tions. This assumption is used in order to prove that the outcome of a strategic
equilibrium of the market is a degenerate lottery. The “individual risk aversion”
assumption excludes the possibility that the consumption sets include indivisible
goods. This makes the comparison of his model with the earlier ones (e.g. RW,
1985) difﬁcult. The work of McLS (1991) dispenses with the convexity assump-
tion, but requires differentiability. Therefore, also in their framework indivisible
goods cannot be studied. On the other hand, one should expect that the convexi-
ﬁcation effects of large numbers may help relax the assumption of individual risk
aversion of preferences. These arguments motivate our assumption of aggregate
risk aversion.
A lottery on allocations is a probability measure on the Borel –algebra of
allocations. We shall say that the economy satisﬁes weak aggregate risk aversion
if for every lottery L on allocations there exists an allocation g such that for
almost all agents ua(g(a)) 
R
F ua(f (a))dL.
We say that the economy satisﬁes weak aggregate risk aversion in the individ-
ually rational domain if it satisﬁes weak aggregate risk aversion when considering
only lotteries that assign an expected utility at least as high as the utility of the
endowment.
A lottery L is degenerate if for almost every agent a there exists a constant
ka such that ua(f (a)) = ka for L-almost all f 2 F. The economy satisﬁes strong
aggregate risk aversion if it satisﬁes weak aggregate risk aversion and for every
lottery which is not degenerate there exists an allocation g that satisﬁes for almost
all a 2 Au a(g(a)) 
R
F ua(f (a))dL, and there exists a set of agents of positive
measure for whom the inequality is strict. Strong aggregate risk aversion in the
individually rational domain is deﬁned just like its weak counterpart.284 N. Dagan et al.
Aggregate risk aversion means that society cannot gain from lotteries over
allocations. The strong version of the property means that if the lottery is non-
degenerate, society actually will lose from having the lottery.
Although this is a property on the aggregate, we ﬁnd conditions on individual
preferences that are weaker than concavity of the utility functions that imply the
corresponding aggregate risk aversion properties.
First we consider an individual with a utility function u : X ! R. We deﬁne
the quasiconcave cover of u as ˆ u : ˆ X ! R, where ˆ X is the convex hull of X:
ˆ u(x) = maxfu(y):x 2 ˆ R(y)g;
where ˆ R(y) is the convex hull of the set of all bundles that are weakly preferred to
y. The assumption that the consumption set X is bounded below and assumption
A1 on the utility function u ensure the existence of ˆ u, as shown in Einy and
Shitovitz (1997, Lemma 3.3). See also Starr (1969, Appendix 3) for an early
treatment of non-convex preferences.
The ﬁrst condition we consider is simply that ˆ u is concave for almost all
agents. The proof of the next result is in the appendix.
Proposition 1 If the quasiconcave covers of the utility functions of almost all
agents are concave, then the economy satisﬁes weak aggregate risk aversion.
A slightly stronger assumption on individual preferences is that the quasicon-
cave cover of the utility function is almost strictly concave. A function v : X ! R
is almost strictly concave if for all x1;x2 2 X such that v(x1) = = v(x2) and for all
 2 (0;1) we have that v(x1+(1−)x2) > v (x1)+(1−)v(x2). The difference
between almost strict concavity and strict concavity is that the former requires
that v(x1) = = v(x2) and not simply that x1 = = x2. This difference is crucial for our
purposes, because if a cover is strictly concave, the original function is strictly
concave as well, whereas functions that are not even quasiconcave may have an
almost strictly concave cover.
Proposition 2 If the quasiconcave covers of the utility functions of almost all
agents are almost strictly concave, then the economy satisﬁes strong aggregate
risk aversion.
This proposition is also proved in the appendix. It follows that if the qua-
siconcave covers (restricted to the individually rational domain) of the utility
functions of almost all agents are almost strictly concave, then the economy sat-
isﬁes strong aggregate risk aversion in the individually rational domain, which
is our assumption A5.
An example will be useful to clarify our last assumption A5.
Example 1 Consider an individual who may consume two goods: one of them
is perfectly divisible and the other is indivisible, (as in RW, 1985). The agent
wants to consume at most one unit of the indivisible good and his reservation
price in terms of the divisible commodity for the ﬁrst unit of the indivisible
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is u(x1;x2)=v(x1 +I(x2)) where I(x2)=1i fx2  1 and I(x2) = 0 otherwise, and
v is a strictly increasing, strictly concave and bounded function from R+ to R.
Suppose now there are many agents with these preferences. They differ only
in their endowments, i.e., each buyer holds only one unit of x1 and each seller
holds one unit of x2. Since the consumption set contains indivisible goods, there
is no clear notion of risk aversion of preferences in this setting. However, the
quasiconcave cover of u, restricted to the individually rational domain, is almost
strictly concave: ˆ u(x1;x2)=v(x1 + minfx2;1g). This implies that if there is a
continuum of such agents, the economy cannot gain from introducing lotteries
over bundles.
3 Description of the game
The set A of all agents is present from the outset. Time runs discretely from 1 to
inﬁnity. In each round the agents are matched at random into coalitions of ﬁnite
size. At every round t there is a proportion  2 (0;1) that is left unmatched. For
each round t and each size n  1, there is a positive probability p(n) of being
matched in an n-person coalition. Thus, p(1) = .4
Matches are made randomly and for a ﬁxed n  2 the probability of being
matched to any n−1 agents chosen from n−1 sets is proportional to the product
of the measures of these sets. Existence of such a random matching process is
guaranteed by the same conditions as in models with only pairwise meetings.
For possible treatments, see McLS (1991, footnote 4) and the references therein.
When a coalition S meets, there is a ‘cheap talk’ phase in which every
agent announces a bundle.5 In addition, an order is chosen at random with equal
probability. Denote by xj the bundle held by agent j 2 S at the beginning of
this meeting. The ﬁrst agent in the order becomes the proposer, who makes
a public offer consisting of a trade (zj)j2S in which
P
j2S zj = 0 and for all
j 2 S;xj + zj 2 X. Responses are also public and occur sequentially following
the order. They can be one of two possible actions: ‘yes,’ and ‘no.’ The trade
proposed to the coalition takes place if and only if every responder agrees to it.
Every agent who is matched in round t can, if he so wishes, leave the market
and consume his bundle after the bargaining session ends. Agents who are not
matched in round t cannot leave the market in that round. In the next round, all
agents who chose to leave abandon the market place and consume their current
bundle. All other agents continue as active traders ready to be matched again.
In each round each agent recognizes the economic characteristics of the agents
with whom he is matched. These consist of the current bundle each of them holds
and their utility functions. However, they do not have information about their
4 All our results go through if we assume that for every n  3, p(n) is arbitrarily small. This
makes our model an -perturbation of Gale’s procedure.
5 The arguments in the characterization theorem (Theorem 1) are entirely independent from this
phase. However, its introduction simpliﬁes greatly the proof of Theorem 2, which could be compli-
cated due to the fact that our model allows for demand correspondences.286 N. Dagan et al.
histories: each agent remembers only his own, but not the others’. They do not
know anything about meetings that do not include them.
The restrictive information available to traders requires us to endow agents
with beliefs about what happens elsewhere in the market. This must be done in
order to have well deﬁned expected utility computations. We will take care of
these details in the next section, where we present our equilibrium notion.
The payoff to a typical trader in this market is the utility of the bundle with
which he leaves the market. Thus, there is no discounting. On the other hand, if
an agent never leaves the market, his utility is the utility corresponding to the
zero bundle. All agents are expected utility maximizers when evaluating lotteries
over bundles.
4 The equilibrium notion and the main result
A strategic equilibrium is a particular type of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (see
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, for the general notion of PBE). Namely, it is a
strategy/belief proﬁle such that, given the beliefs explained below, every agent
plays a best response to the others at every information set. On the equilibrium
path, we shall assume that beliefs are derived from the equilibrium strategies
using Bayes’ rule. On the other hand, off the equilibrium path we shall assume
that each agent believes that a full measure of the agents continues to play
according to the equilibrium. This equilibrium concept is motivated and formally
deﬁned in the sequel.
Since each agent is an entity of measure 0 in the continuum and since each
of them has met only a ﬁnite number of agents in all the rounds up to round t,
we can deﬁne the variable of the “state of the market.” That is, a ﬁxed proﬁle of
strategies played by the continuum of agents determines the state of the market
in round t as a distribution over characteristics. This happens with independence
of the actions of a set of measure 0 (the history of an agent at a given point).
Notice that the distribution over characteristics that we refer to as the ‘state
of the market’ need not be supported by an allocation of the economy. Such an
example can be constructed following the one found in Kannai (1970). However,
a distribution is all an expected utility maximizing agent needs in order to make
his calculations.
Alternatively (and more rigorously from a technical point of view), we could
take the approach based on distributions like in Hart, Hildenbrand and Kohlberg
(1974) instead of the name-based approach. We should then assume (like Gale,
1986a,b,c; Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990; McLS, 1991) that any two agents
with identical characteristics and histories play the same strategy. This would
enable us to employ the machinery developed by McLS (1991, Sect.3.3) in
order to establish that for any given strategies the “state of the market” in round
t in the sense of distribution of agents’ characteristics is deterministic. See also
Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, pp. 160-161), who show this for the ﬁnite type
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equivalence theorem that by-passes the difﬁculty. However, this is far from being
the case, as pointed out by Khan and Sun (1999). Ultimately, we agree with
Khan and Sun (1999) on the need to look for alternative ways other than the
continuum to model mass interactions. After all, the continuum should be just an
idealization, and we should avoid the technical complications that do exist and
divert attention from the economic content of the model.
Now we can state more formally the equilibrium concept based on Osborne
and Rubinstein (1990) as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 A strategic equilibrium is a pair of functions (;), that assign to
each agent a strategy and a belief, such that:
(i) The beliefs  are the “state of the market” beliefs induced by  both on and
off the equilibrium path,
(ii) For each agent a and for each of his information sets, (a) prescribes a best
response to (Ana) given the beliefs (a).
Our characterization result follows.
Theorem 1 Suppose that the economy satisﬁes assumptions A0–A5. In every
strategic equilibrium there exists a core allocation f such that almost every agent
a eventually leaves the market with a bundle g(a) such that u(g(a)) = u(f (a)).
Note that in equilibrium an agent may receive a lottery over different bundles
(due to the random matching process and possibly to mixed strategies, the same
equilibrium comprises different paths). However, all of these bundles belong to
the same indifference surface. If there were several core allocations that assigned
the same utility to almost every agent, then the outcome could be a lottery over
these core allocations.
Proof. Consider a strategic equilibrium. All of our statements are relative to
this equilibrium and to histories in which at most a set of agents of measure
0 has deviated. Since each agent’s history is private information and as the
matching process treats all agents alike, two agents with the same characteristics
and beliefs must get the same payoff regardless of their histories. If not, the agent
with the lower payoff would simply imitate the behavior of the other and get
the same probability distribution over outcomes. Recall that all agents have the
same beliefs about the “state of the market” independent of their histories.
All agents at the beginning of round t before their match has been determined
believe that the “state of the market” corresponds to the equilibrium. Thus in the
equilibrium all such agents that in addition share the same characteristics have
the same expected utility. We denote this utility by V (c;t). For each c =( u;e),
we deﬁne w(c)=u(e).
Step 1: V (c;t)  w(c) for all values c and t.
To see this, notice that every agent with characteristics c in period t can
adopt the following strategy: whenever matched, propose the zero trade, reject288 N. Dagan et al.
any trade, and leave the market. Since with probability 1 he will be matched in
ﬁnite time, this strategy guarantees him a payoff of w(c).
Step 2: V (c;t)  V (c;t + 1) for all values of c and t.
This assertion follows from the fact that by proposing the null trade and
rejecting every offer and staying in the market, any agent in the market in round
t is sure to be in the market in round t + 1 with the same bundle as in round t.
We shall say that an agent is ‘about to leave the market’ if he has already
reached an information set at which his strategy tells him to leave.
Step 3: For an agent of characteristic c who is about to leave the market in round
t, we have that V (c;t +1 )=w(c).
The proof of this step is also simple. By step 1, we have that V (c;t +1 )
w(c). If V (c;t +1)>w (c) and given that this agent is about to leave the market,
he would be better off by deviating and staying in the market until round t +1 .
Step 4: At some round t there is a positive measure of agents who are about to
leave the market.
To prove this step, we argue by contradiction. Suppose that no positive mea-
sure of agents ever leaves the market. In this case the utility of almost all agents
is that of the zero bundle. On the other hand, at any point in time there is a
positive measure of agents who hold a bundle different from the zero bundle.
This contradicts step 1.
At this point our method of proof departs crucially from Gale’s. Instead of
proceeding through a sequence of lemmas based on the existence of the marginal
rates of substitution, we employ the insights of the theory of the core. This
different technique yields a simpler proof.
Step 5: There does not exist a coalition S 2 A with (S) > 0, that has an
S-allocation g for which ua(g(a)) > V (c(a);1) for almost all a 2 S, where c(a)
is the initial characteristics of agent a.
To prove this step, we also argue by contradiction. Assume there exist such
a coalition and such an allocation. Then, by Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders
(1989, Claim 1) there exists a partition of this coalition into h + 1 coalitions
S0;S1;:::;Sh such that (S1)=(S2)= = (Sh) > 0 and a list of trades
z1;:::;zh such that for all a 2 Sm;m =1 ;:::;hu a(e(a)+zm) > ua(g(a)) and P
m zm  0.
Informally, this means that there are ‘many’ h-person (ﬁnite) coalitions that
can improve upon the S-allocation g.
By step 4, at some round t a positive measure of agents is about to leave
the market. We will show now that, under the contradiction hypothesis we are
making, i.e., the existence of the improving coalition S, step 3 would be violated.
Recall that in every round t a positive measure of agents did not trade yet and
thus keep their initial endowment. In particular, there is a positive measure of
agents that can be chosen from each of the above coalitions S1;:::;Sh. It follows
from step 2 that in every round t the probability of an agent to be matched in an
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is positive: if fi1;:::;ihg, i1 2 S1, ..., ih 2 Sh was an improving coalition in
round 1, so it continues to be in round t.
But then each person who is about to leave the market can adopt the follow-
ing strategy: to stay in the market and whenever being a proposer in such an
improving coalition, to offer them an improving trade z which gives the proposer
higher amounts of some divisible goods without giving away any amount of the
others; in all other situations, he holds on to his bundle and leaves the market at
some ﬁnite date.
The proposal z will be unanimously accepted by the members of the im-
proving coalition since for each of them with characteristic c =( u;e) we have
that:
V ((u;e + zc);t +1 ) u(e + zc) > V (c;1)  V (c;t +1 ) ;
where the ﬁrst inequality follows from step 1, the second from the existence of
the improving trade z for the group of responders and the third from step 2.
Clearly, this deviation gives the deviating agent a higher expected utility than
the utility of his current bundle, which contradicts step 3.
Step 6: In a strategic equilibrium, there exists a core allocation f such that
almost every agent a eventually leaves the market with a bundle g(a) such that
u(g(a)) = u(f (a)).
We prove this step using a couple of arguments. [a]: By the previous step
applied to the set of all agents A, it is not true that A can improve upon the
strategic equilibrium outcome. This implies that almost every agent is receiving
a degenerate lottery over bundles: otherwise, since the economy satisﬁes strong
aggregate risk aversion, step 5 would be violated. And [b]: In addition, by ap-
plying step 5 to any other coalition of positive measure, the equilibrium outcome
satisﬁes all the core conditions.
In order to choose the core allocation that is utility equivalent to the equi-
librium outcome, note that almost every path in the extensive form associated
with the equilibrium strategies constitutes a core allocation. Thus, it sufﬁces to
choose any such path. k
Corollary 1 Suppose that the economy satisﬁes assumptions A0–A5. In every
strategic equilibrium there exists a Walrasian price p such that almost all agents
eventually leave the market with a bundle that maximizes their utility on the budget
set corresponding to the price p and to their initial endowment e.
Proof. By Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders (1989, Theorem 2), A0–A3 imply
that core allocations are Walrasian. k
Remark: If agents are allowed to observe the state of the market every period,
Theorem 1 and its proof go through without change when the solution concept
used is the unrestricted set of perfect Bayesian equilibria.290 N. Dagan et al.
5 Supporting Walrasian allocations by strategic equilibria
In Corollary 1 we have shown that all strategic equilibrium outcomes are Wal-
rasian. Next we show the converse. That is, for every Walrasian allocation we
ﬁnd strategies that support it as a strategic equilibrium. In the proof below, no
use will be made of the fact that the Walrasian allocation f is also a core al-
location. This departs from the papers on implementation of the core in ﬁnite
games and economies (e.g., Perry and Reny, 1994; Serrano, 1995; Serrano and
Vohra, 1997). There, the strategies that support each core allocation are of the
following form: the allocation in question is proposed to the grand coalition, and
it is unanimously accepted. Obviously, such a construction is not possible in a
continuum of agents where only sets of measure 0 meet to trade.
Theorem 2 Let f be a Walrasian allocation corresponding to an equilibrium
price p and suppose that all agents have a maximizer over every budget set cor-
responding to the price vector p. Then, there exists a strategy proﬁle that supports
f as a strategic equilibrium outcome of the game.
The assumption in Theorem 2 is needed in our model as we can have Wal-
rasian equilibria with some prices equal to 0. In this case, it could be that some
agents (that constitute a set of measure 0) do not have an optimal bundle in
their budget sets even in the equilibrium allocation. Of course, if equilibrium
prices are all positive, or the model is a single market, (e.g. like in RW, 1985),
the assumption in Theorem 2 is satisﬁed. In the models of Gale (1986a,b,c) and
McLS (1991), such an assumption is also needed since they work with open
consumption sets.
The next proof builds on Gale (1986b). In particular, in order to support each
Walrasian allocation by a strategic equilibrium, it sufﬁces to have trade only in
pairs. However, we cannot simply invoke Gale’s results, as our model allows
agents to have set-valued demand correspondences.
Proof. For each agent a let h(a;e) be a function that assigns to each agent a
with holdings e a bundle selected from the agents’ demand correspondence with
respect to the price p and the income pe. The selection h is restricted so that
h(a;e)=f (a)i fpe = pe(a). Now consider the following strategy proﬁle:
(1) In all meetings every trader announces during the ‘cheap talk’ phase the
bundle assigned to him by the selection h.
(2) In multilateral meetings (those with at least three agents), the proposer offers
the 0 trade.
(3) In bilateral meetings, the proposer offers a trade according to the trading rule
g deﬁned below (which is based on Gale, 1986b).
(4) In all meetings, every responder a who currently holds e that did not achieve
the bundle h(a;e) accepts a trade if and only if his income (the value of his
holdings evaluated at the prices p) does not decrease. If he already achieved
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(5) Every agent leaves the market as soon as he achieves the bundle h(a;e).
On the equilibrium path and as in Gale (1986b), we shall distinguish between
the behavior of one of the divisible commodities (say, commodity 1) and that of
the other jDj + jIj−1 goods. While according to the trading rule g an agent’s
excess demand in commodities other than 1 is non-increasing, commodity 1
serves to balance the budget whenever there is no pure coincidence of wants.
In order to deﬁne the trading rule g, we shall denote the proposer by a0 and the
responder by a1. Subscripts denote agents and superscripts denote commodities.
Let z0 be h(a0;e(a0;t))−e(a0;t), where e(a0;t) are the holdings of a0 in round
t, and similarly let z1 be h(a1;e(a1;t)) − e(a1;t). Deﬁne the set B(z0;z1)a st h e
set of vectors x 2 RD ZI satisfying the following conditions (where Z denotes
the set of integers):
(i) jxkjj zk
i j; i =0 ;1; k  2
(ii) 0  (−1)ixkzk
i ; i =0 ;1; k  2
(iii) e(ai)+( −1)ix 2 RD
+  NI and px =0 i =0 ;1.
If the net trade x is proposed and accepted, the proposer’s new endowment
e(a0;t +1 )=e(a0;t)+x and the responder’s e(a1;t +1 )=e(a1;t) − x.
Now we are ready to present the trading rule proposed in all bilateral meet-
ings. The trade proposed is denoted by:




Denote by u(c;p) the maximum utility that an agent with characteristics c
can achieve over the budget set determined by his endowment and the prices p.
We will show that if every agent behaves according to the speciﬁed strategies,
almost every agent of characteristic c achieves a bundle (corresponding to the
allocation f ) that yields u(c;p) in ﬁnite time.
Notice ﬁrst, as in Gale (1986b), that if agents follow the speciﬁed strategies,
it is not possible for an agent to increase his income as evaluated by the prices
p. Next we will show that an agent a ends up at the bundle f (a) in ﬁnite time
with probability 1. This will show that the proposed strategies are a strategic
equilibrium. That is, given that there is no way to increase one’s income, the
proposed strategies induce a random path that takes each agent to his chosen
maximizer f (a) over the budget set determined by e and p.
For each agent a and for prices p deﬁne the excess demand as follows (for
convenience and given that the Walrasian prices p are ﬁxed throughout, we shall
drop p from the expressions below): (a;t)=f (a)−e(a;t), where e(a;t) are the
holdings of agent a at round t. Notice that, given the strategies speciﬁed above,
every agent travels along the frontier of his budget set which means that f (a)
continues to be a utility maximizer for agent a.
As we said above, we shall distinguish between the behavior of commodity 1
and that of the others. The trading rule g is constructed so that the absolute value
of the excess demand of every agent in all goods but 1 does not increase. On292 N. Dagan et al.
the other hand, good 1 serves to balance the budget whenever there is no pure
coincidence of wants. Thus we deﬁne for each agent a the following number:
(a;t)=
P
k2 jk(a;t)j. That is, for each agent a the statistic (a;t) indicates
the sum of absolute values of excess demands in all goods but 1 in round t.
We will next show that over time the distribution of (a;t) converges weakly in
measure to a degenerate distribution concentrated on 0.
Recall that  denotes the measure of characteristics in the economy, i.e., the
measure of characteristics of all agents who are active in the market plus that of
the agents who already left the market. The random matching process and the
speciﬁed strategies lead to new distributions of characteristics at every round,
and hence to new distributions of the statistic (a;t). We shall concentrate on
an arbitrary path determined by a particular realization of the different random
variables at play (the coalitions that meet and the roles of each agent in each
meeting). We show then that, along this path, the distribution of (a;t) converges
in measure to the degenerate distribution concentrated on 0.
The space of characteristics C at each round t is the Cartesian product of a
ﬁxed space of utility functions with RD
+  NI. The evolution of the economy is
thus described by a sequence of measurable maps from the set of agents A to the
set C. Given that the set of utility functions is ﬁxed throughout the model, any
Cauchy sequence of such measurable maps must converge to a measurable map
from A to C. To see this, notice that, after having ﬁxed the utility functions, the
marginal of characteristics c on agents’ endowments e allows us to consider a
Cauchy sequence of integrable maps from A to RD
+  NI. Endowing this space
of integrable maps with the topology induced by the supremum norm, it is easy
to see that such a sequence converges to an integrable map into RD
+  NI as
this is a complete space. Notice that the marginal of the measure t on utility
functions is constant. We can then abuse notation slightly and denote by t
round t’s measure on the agents’ endowments and not on characteristics. Thus,
using Hildenbrand (1974, p.50) the sequence of measures ftg is tight and has a
convergent subsequence to . Without loss of generality, suppose the sequence
itself converges to .
By the properties of the trading rule g, we must have that for a given constant
>0,
R
(a;t) (a;t) converges to 0 as time goes to inﬁnity. To see this, we
argue by contradiction. Suppose that the limiting measure  is not the one
concentrated at 0. Since  is the limiting measure, it must be the case that the
measure of agents trading positive amounts of goods when the distribution of
(a;t) is approximately  must be arbitrarily close to 0: For all >0 there
exists a T such that for all t > T we have that
R
[t − ] < .I f is not
the one concentrated at 0, there must exist a positive measure of agents whose
characteristics satisfy that k(c) > 0 for some good k. By Walras’ law which
holds at each step of this time path, there must also exist a positive fraction of
agents whose characteristics satisfy that k(c) < 0. Since the matching process
is random, there exists a positive probability that agents in these two situations
will meet. Finally, given the trading rule g, these agents will trade at least in
good k, which is a contradiction, i.e., there exists >0 such that for all T thereBargaining, coalitions and competition 293
exists t > T with
R
[t − ] >as g(z0;z1) stays bounded away from 0 for a
positive fraction of meetings.
As for convergence in ﬁnite time, the arguments are identical to those in Gale
(1986b, Sect.7). k
6 Discussion
By using the insights of the theory of the core, this paper presents a model of
trade through non-cooperative bargaining in coalitions of ﬁnite size. This allows
us to obtain equivalence results among core, Walrasian and strategic equilib-
rium allocations for a wide class of large exchange economies, including non-
differentiable non-convex preferences and an arbitrary number of divisible and
indivisible goods.
Our results are robust to several extensions of the model. First, we could allow
for any entry process (not necessarily one-time entry) as long as the measure of
the total entering population is ﬁnite. Second, different bargaining procedures
in the coalitional meetings could be adopted: for example, veto power can be
given only to those responders who are offered a non-zero trade vector. Third,
we only need to assume that an agent’s probability of meeting a coalition of size
n be positive. In particular, we could assume that the probability of meeting a
coalition of more than two agents be arbitrarily small and all our results would
go through (because the probability of meeting a coalition of a given size always
ends up being 1). Thus, Gale’s model can be viewed as the “limit” of ours as
the probabilities of multilateral meetings vanish. This poses the important open
question of lower hemicontinuity of the equilibrium payoff correspondence, i.e.,
which of the extra assumptions made by Gale are really needed to obtain the result
using only trade in pairs. Fourth, in a model with discounting, the conclusions of
our main result (Theorem 1 and Corollary 1) extend as discounting is removed.
A separate dimension along which our results are more robust than the pre-
vious ones found in the literature is the class of economies to which they apply.
We discuss this in length in the following paragraphs, especially comparing our
results to the works of Gale (1986a, b, c) and McLS (1991).
Existence of equilibrium
Thanks to considering ﬁnite coalitions in the procedure, our paper yields the
equivalence between strategic and Walrasian equilibria under essentially the same
assumptions as those needed for the core equivalence theorem. Moreover, our
assumptions also guarantee the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium, as opposed
to Gale (1986a, b, c) and McLS (1991), which deal with open consumption sets.294 N. Dagan et al.
Limited applicability of the previous models
As discussed in the introduction, we regard the relaxation of differentiability
as a crucial conceptual departure from Gale’s and McLS’s work. From an ap-
plied view-point, the differentiability assumption by itself that Gale (1986a, c)
and McLS (1991) make is not very restrictive: many models in economics in-
corporate it in order to allow for a closed solution and for the performance of
comparative statics exercises. However, the proofs of the above mentioned au-
thors rely on additional strong assumptions, that exclude most applied models.
Gale (1986a) assumes that for each utility function the support of the endowments
compatible with it is the entire consumption set. This assumption excludes the
possibility of a ﬁnite type economy. Gale (1986c), who assumes a ﬁnite number
of types, uses a bounded curvature assumption, thereby excluding, for example,
Cobb–Douglas utility functions on the non-negative orthant or its interior. McLS
(1991) make either a bounded curvature assumption similar to Gale’s (1986c) or
a restriction on the equilibrium which seems to require an assumption similar to
Gale’s (1986a) on the primitives of the economy. In contrast, our model, which
applies to very general economies, also applies to these standard cases.
Feasibility in and out of equilibrium
We assume, like Gale (1986a, b, c), that the ﬂow of agents entering the market
constitutes an economy, i.e., they sum up to a ﬁnite measure. In addition, we
also assume that short sales are not allowed. These two assumptions together
ensure that the ﬂow of agents out of the market is consistent with the feasibility
constraint of the economy. Suppose, like McLS (1991), that the total measure
of agents is ﬁnite, but short sales are allowed. In this case, nothing assures that
feasibility is met. Consider an arbitrary assignment of bundles to agents, and the
following strategies (that do not constitute an equilibrium in McLS’s game with
short sales). Each proposer asks for the bundle assigned arbitrarily to him and
each responder accepts any proposal; agents leave the market as soon as they
reach their assigned bundle. Clearly, these strategies guarantee that each agent
will get with probability 1 the assigned bundle. The problem stays even if we
restrict attention to the equilibria of their game. Indeed, the strategic equilibrium
that McLS propose (pp. 1395–1396) to support a Walrasian equilibrium is a
strategic equilibrium for any prices. That is, for an arbitrary price vector, their
strategic equilibrium gives the outcome that every agent maximizes over the
corresponding budget set, but the market clearing conditions may be violated.
The problem is a consequence of assuming unlimited short sales. See Dagan,
Serrano and Volij (1998) for other related comments on the McLS model.
Strict concavity and indivisible goods
McLS (1991) note the restrictiveness of Gale’s (1986a, b, c) assumption of strictly
concave utility functions in a continuum setting. One should expect that the con-Bargaining, coalitions and competition 295
vexifying effects of large numbers could be helpful to relax this assumption.
McLS do not make any assumption regarding the concavity of utility functions;
instead, they allow for short sales, which enables them to prove that outcomes
of the strategic equilibria are not random. McLS also maintain the differentia-
bility assumption, which precludes non-convexities arising from the existence of
indivisible commodities.
One difference between the underlying economy and the strategic model is
that in the latter the outcome (at least for an individual agent) may be random
and thus preferences on random outcomes must play a role. Gale (1986a) uses
the strict concavity assumption only to ensure that the introduction of lotteries
does not enlarge the set of possible utilities of the agents. Thus, what is needed
is a property of risk aversion in the aggregate. We impose a condition on the
quasiconcave covers of the utility functions that ensures the sufﬁcient degree of
aggregate risk aversion. This assumption is compatible with having indivisible
commodities as well as other kinds of non-convexities. Thus, our assumptions
allow for a uniﬁed treatment of assignment markets (markets for an indivisible
good) ` a la RW (1985) and classical exchange economies with divisible commodi-
ties ` a la Gale (1986a, b, c). We should stress that our assumption of aggregate
risk aversion is sufﬁcient to obtain Gale’s results as well (of course, within his
restricted subdomain).
Appendix
This appendix contains the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let L be a lottery on allocations. We deﬁne EUa(L)= R
F ua(f (a))dL. We also deﬁne Ea(L)=
R
F f (a)dL and h : A ! RD[I
+ as the
function that assigns to each agent a the bundle Ea(L). It is easy to see that h
is integrable. Now let (a)=fx 2 RD[I
+ :ˆ ua(x)  ˆ ua(h(a))g. Clearly,
R
h(a) 2 R
(a) since it is true for every a. Let  (a)=fx 2 X : ua(x)  ˆ ua(h(a))g.
It follows from the deﬁnition of ˆ u that ˆ  (a)=(a), where ˆ  (a) is the convex
hull of  (a). Now consider
R
 (a). It follows from Liapunov’s theorem that this









there exists an allocation g such that ua(g(a))  ˆ ua(h(a)) for almost all a 2 A.
It follows from the fact that all the covers ˆ u are concave that almost all agents
weakly prefer the allocation g to the lottery L. k
Proof of Proposition 2. Let L be a non-degenerate lottery over allocations. First
it follows from Proposition 1 that there exists an allocation g that satisﬁes that
ua(g(a))  ˆ ua(h(a)) for almost all a 2 A. Since the lottery is non-degenerate,
there is a positive measure of agents such that each of them is not indifferent
among almost all bundles in the support of L. Now for each agent a in this set,
we can have two cases:
1. There does not exist k such that for L-almost all f 2 F,ˆ ua(f (a)) = k.I n
this case, it follows from almost strict concavity of ˆ u that ˆ ua(h(a)) > EUa(L).296 N. Dagan et al.
2. There exists k such that for L-almost all f 2 F, we have that ˆ ua(f (a)) = k.
Since the agent is not indifferent among almost all bundles, there exists a set
of allocations that are assigned positive probability by L such that ˆ ua(f (a)) >
ua(f (a)). Thus, ˆ ua(h(a)) = k > EUa(L). k
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